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A Noble Sacrifice?
Jus adBellum and the International Community's
Gamble in Chechnya
PETER DANIEL DIPAOLA"
INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 1995, Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya,' once again
lived up to its name: "Menacing."2 Grozny had become a victim of war, and
dead bodies littered its streets? Since 1783, when the Russians first invaded
the Caucasus region, Chechens and Russians have engaged in periodic
warfare;" and despite the passing of 220 years, the same issue drives the
current conflict: the Chechen people's resistance to Russian domination.
Regrettably, each outbreak of violence has resulted in a great deal of human
suffering; the recent fighting is no exception. Thousands of innocent people
have died5 and many more have been displaced since the fighting began in
1994.6
Wars, like the conflict in Chechnya, have been a part of the international
system since its inception, and for nearly as long thinkers have been pondering
* J.D., 1997, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., 1994, University of Notre
Dame. The author would like to thank Professor David Fidler for his patient assistance and Professor Toivo
Raun for his helpful comments.
1. The Chechens refer to themselves as Nakhchuo or Nakhcho, and to Chechnya as the Nokhchijn
Republika Ichkeriy [or as the Western papers have reported, the "Republic of Ichkeria." See, e.g. Michael
Gordon, Chechen Rebels Trying to Act as a De Facto Government, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, § 1, at I].
CHRISTOPHER PANICO, CONFLICT STUD. No. 281, CONFICTS IN THE CAUCASUS: RussiA's WAR IN
CHECHNYA20 n.l (1995). However, for the purposes of this Note and in light of common usage, the words
"Chechen" and "Chechnya" will be used.
2. In Russian, Grozny means "menacing." PAsico, supra note i, at 3.
3. Michael Specter, Hundreds Killed in Chechen Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at Al.
4. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
5. In September 1996, Aleksander I. Lebed, the former Russian security chief, maintained that "about
80,000 people had been killed in the fighting and that some 240,000 had been wounded." Michael Gordon,
Chechnya Toll Is Far Higher, 80,000 Dea, Lebed Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at A3.
6. In August 1996, "[tlhe total number of displaced Chechens in Dagestan and Ingushetia... [stood]
at more than 100,000." UN. Airifis Emergency Supplies to Chechen Reftgees, Reuters World Service, Aug.
22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
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ways to prevent, or at least control, the fighting.7 The most well-known of the
early attempts to impose controls on resorting to the use of force was the
Christian Just War doctrine,8 but it was not until the Enlightenment that
thinkers raised the issue of controlling the resort to war through international
law.' Over time, two distinct schools of thought developed with regard to the
regulation of war: jus ad bellum, which addressed the international legal
regulation on resorting to the use of force; andjus in bello, which contained
the international legal rules of the conduct of war. In the 1940s,
representatives of the international community attempted to codify the
principles ofjus ad bellum in articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations (U.N.)
Charter." In 1986, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) declared that
articles 2(4) and 51 represented customary international law." As customary
international law, these principles are binding on all States; further, the I.C.J.
has recognized them asjus cogens.'3
In the case of Chechnya, the international community has applied the rules
of war selectively. From the beginning of the conflict, world leaders have
maintained that "(Chechnya) is an internal Russian affair,"' 4 and that Russia
has the right to defend its territorial integrity.' The U.N. has also adopted this
stance. In an interview, then-U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
stated, "[Chechnya] is a purely internal affair.... [in which the U.N.] can't get
7. See F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE; THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES (1963).
8. David Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the Reagan Years, 11 ARiz. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 45, 56 (1994). For a summary of the Christian Just War doctrine, see IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY THE STATES 4-18 (1963).
9. Fidler, supra note 8, at 56.
10. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against other states, and article 51 defines self-
defense and limits it to defending against an armed attack. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 and art. 51.
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 27, 92-96 (IN 34, 173-180)
(June 27). For a discussion on the effect of an I.C.J. ruling on the international community, see Louis
Henkin, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, in RIGHT VS. MIGHT 37, 49-50 (1989).
12. Johnathan Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. I (1985).
13. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 100 (1 190) (stating that the rule against the
use of force is "a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character ofjus cogens.").
14. Charles Hecker, Europe Condemns Slaying of Civilians, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, MOSTMS File (statement by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe).
15. Remarks at White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Western Europe
in Cleveland, Ohio, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DoC. 51, 54 (Jan. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton Remarks].
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involved... , 6 Even Helsinki Watch, a human rights organization, considers
"Chechnya part of Russian territory."' 7  As a result, the international
community has made no mention ofjus ad bellum; and, while world leaders
have expressed disapproval of the Russian army's apparent disregard for
civilian casualties" and asked Russian President Boris Yeltsin to pursue a
peaceful settlement to the dispute,'9 they have in no way treated the situation
in Chechnya as inter-state conflict.
Despite almost universal international agreement on this point, I contend
that the violence in Chechnya is not an internal matter. It is an international
conflict to which the full scope ofjus ad bellum andjus in bello should apply.
By taking a different position, the international community is making a
considerable gamble. They are wagering that the potential positive
consequences of doing nothing (e.g., the continued development of Russian
democracy and a stable Caucasus region) will outweigh the certain negative
consequences (e.g., the undermining of the rule of law and the subjugation of
the Chechen people). In this paper, I will argue that this gamble is an accurate
portrayal of the situation by examining the Chechen conflict in the following
manner. In Section I, I will discuss Chechnya's historical relationship with
Russia and the events which led to the current conflict. In Section II, I will
demonstrate how Russia has violated customary international law on jus ad
bellum.2° Finally, in Section III, having established that Russia's actions
violated customary international law, I will address the reasons why I believe
16. Larry King Live: Interview with Boutros Boutros-Ghali (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 22,
1994), Transcript No. 1312, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File [hereinafter Boutros-Ghali
Interview].
17. Steven Erlanger, Behind the Bearhug: Chechnya's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at A14
(statement made by Aleksandr Petrov, head of Helsinki Watch's Moscow office).
18. Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen stated, "What is happening is unacceptable. A
civilized society does not solve conflicts in a way which leads to so much human suffering." Hecker, supra
note 14. Likewise, other European countries such as France, Germany, Poland, and Britain, have spoken
out against Russia's actions in Chechnya. Id. In the United States, President Clinton stated that "the
violence must end," and he called on "the parties to stop spilling blood and start making peace." Clinton
Remarks, supra note 15, at 54.
19. Steven Erlanger, Clinton Writes Yeltsin on Grozny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at AS.
20. In this paper, I limit my discussion tojus ad bellum. Russia's violations ofjus in bello are
apparent and have been thoroughly discussed by other authors. For an excellent discussion of howjus in
bello applies to Chechnya, see Duncan B. Hollis, Accountability in Chechnya-Addressing Internal Matters
with Legal and Political International Norms, 36 B.C. L. REv. 793 (1995). For discussion of specificjus
in bello violations, see Crisis in Chechnya: Hearings Before the Comm. on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 104th Cong., 124-27 (1995) (Sergei Kovalev's Report to the Deputies of the State Duma); Id. at
77 (testimony of Amnesty International) [hereinafter Hearings].
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the international community has not spoken out, and I will explain why the
international community's inaction is a high stakes gamble.
I. THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
A. History of Chechnyai
Chechnya, located along Russia's southern border with Georgia, is mostly
plains with the Caucasus mountains comprising only twenty percent of its
territory.' In 1989, 1.27 million Soviet citizens lived in the Chechen-Ingush
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR)." The majority of these
inhabitants were not ethnic Russians; rather, they were Chechens, a distinct
ethnic group who have lived in the mountains and plains of Chechnya since
the first millennium B.C.' Unlike the Russian people, Chechens are not Slavs.
They descended from the eastern branch of the Veinakh people and are closely
related to the Ingush. 5 Further, the Chechens practice Sunni Islam' and speak
a distinctive Caucasian language which is different from both the Slavic and
the Turkish languages prevalent in the area.27 In addition, the Chechen culture
and traditions are different from those of the Russians. 8 Despite their
dissimilarities, the two groups do have one thing in common: They share a
bloody history of warfare and Russian subjugation.
In 1783, Tsarist Russia began a campaign into the Northern Caucasus in
order to establish a link between mother Russia and the newly acquired
Georgia. 9 This incursion set into motion a series of uprisings and revolts in
Chechnya and the surrounding mountain republics. Continuous fighting
21. For a more detailed history of Chechnya's relationship with Russia and the Soviet Union, see
Abdurahman Avtorkhanov, The Chechens and the Ingush During the Soviet Period and Its Antecedents, in
THE NORTH CAUCASUS BARRIER: THE RUssIAN ADVANCE TOWARDS THE MUSLIM WORLD (Marie
Bennigsen Broxup ed., 1992).
22. PANiCO, supra note I, at 20 n.2.
23. Id. at 2. According to the 1989 survey, conducted before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
population the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was composed of 58% Chechens, 23% Russians, and 13% Ingush.
The survey also found that 59% of the population was rural, largely Chechen and Ingush. Id.
24. V.B. Vinogradov & N.P. Gritsenko, Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 29
GREAT SoVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA 79 (Macmillian, Inc. trans., 1982).
25. PANICO, supra note 1, at 2.
26. Id.
27. Hearings, supra note 20, at 9 (statement of Mohammed Shashani, President, Chechen-Ingush
Society of America).
28. Id.
29. PANICO, supra note 1, at 2.
[Vol. 4:435
A NOBLE SACRIFICE?
marked the first eighty years of the Russian occupation.' Finally, in 1859
after a brutal campaign,"1 the Russian army forced the leader of the resistance
in the North Caucasus, Imam Shamil, to surrender. In spite of this victory,
however, the Chechens were not willing subjects of the Russian empire. In
1894 a Russian study of the area found that the Chechens had not yet been
"fully pacified."3
On May 11, 1918, during the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the North
Caucasian people convened a Congress of the Union of Peoples of the North
Caucasus. At this Congress, they elected a president and declared their
independence." By 1921, Bolshevik forces had crushed this new republic; but
before its demise, Turkey, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and General Thompson
in the name of the British government had all recognized it.' 4  Under
Communism, the relationship between the Chechens and their imperial rulers
did not improve. On Red Army Day, February 23, 1944, Stalin forcibly
deported all the Chechens and Ingush to Central Asia and dissolved the
Chechen-Ingush ASSR During their exile, approximately twenty-five
percent of the deported Chechens and Ingush died, many en route. 6
Finally, in 1957, the Soviet authorities allowed the Chechens and the
Ingush to return, but they were now foreigners in their own homeland. The
Chechens came back to find strangers in their homes," and they became the
victims of widespread job and educational discrimination.38 Further, they were
under-employed in the skilled trades and utilized primarily as migrant
30. Id
31. Russian forces would enter the Chechen villages, while the men were in the mountains, kill the
women and children, poison the wells, slaughter the stock, and burn the crops and houses. Hearings, supra
note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Mohammed Shashani, President, Chechen-Ingush Society of America). See
also Moshe Grammer, Russian Strategies in the Conquest ofChechnya and Daghestan, 1825-1859, in THE
NORTH CAUCASUS BARRIER: THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOwARDS THE MUSLIM WORLD (Marie Bennigsen
Broxup ed., 1992).
32. PANICO, supra note 1, at 3.
33. Hearings, supra note 20, at 10 (statement of Mohammed Shashani, President, Chechen-Ingush
Society of America).
34. Marie Bennigsen Broxup, Who are the Chechens?, Crosslines: Global Rep., (1995)
<http://canyon.oneworld.org/crosslines/crosslines-background.html>.
35. PANIC, supra note 1, at 3.
36. Id. at 4.
37. One such Chechen who returned to find his old home occupied by strangers was Dzhokhar
Dudayev. In August 1991, while on leave in Grozny, Dudayev used this fact to demonstrate empathy with
the Chechen nationalist cause, and subsequently, a group of Chechen elders elected him to lead the Chechen
Pan-National Congress. STEVEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S NEW MAFIYA 215 (1995).
38. PANiCO, supra note 1, at4.
19971
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
farmers. 39 This discrimination continued until August 1991 when, under the
leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya declared its independence from
Russia.
B. The Road to War
In August 1991, members of the Soviet government and the armed forces
staged a putsch against then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. At that
time, the head of the Communist apparatus in Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Doku
Zavgayev, did not condemn the putsch. Instead, he adopted a wait-and-see
approach.4" On August 22, 1991 rallies took place in Grozny calling for the
resignation of Zavgayev. Later, on September 6, national guard units under
the control of Dzhokhar Dudayev stormed the pro-Communist Supreme Soviet
in Grozny and shut it down.4 At first, Boris Yeltsin, who was leading the anti-
putsch forces, greeted this news with enthusiasm because he viewed Zavgayev
as a traitor.42 However, Yeltsin's opinion of events would change.
On October 27, 1991, Dudayev was elected Chechen President with
eighty-five percent of the vote. 3 Five days later, on November 2, Chechnya
declared independence from the Russian Federation, but Russia did not
recognize Dudayev's election or Chechnya's declaration of independence."
Almost immediately, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and sent 650
soldiers to Grozny with instructions to reimpose order.4 However, when the
soldiers arrived, Chechen militia troops surrounded the Russian camps and
threatened to shoot anyone who left them. On November 11, a potential crisis
39. Id
40. Id at 5.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id at 7. The validity of this election was questioned both inside and outside Chechnya. Id For
other sources which maintain the vote was a fraud, see Andrei Fadin, The War in Chechnya is Becoming
Inter-Chechen, OBSHCHAVA GAZETA, Dec. 21-27, 1995, at 8 (condensed text), reprinted in CuRRENT DIG.
OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 17, 1996, vol. XLVII, no. 51, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP
File; Andrew Meier, The Chechen Mafia: The Real Reason Yeltsin Invaded, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 24,
1995, at 16; Yeltsin Defends Russia's Action in Chechnya, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1,
reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 25, 1995, vol. XLVI, no. 52, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File [hereinafter Justification Address].
44. PANICO, supra note 1, at 7.
45. Rebel Chechnya a Thorn in Russia's Flesh, Reuters World Service, Dec. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File [hereinafter Thorn in Russia's Flesh).
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was avoided when the Russian parliament voted 177 to 4 to rescind the
emergency order, and Yeltsin recalled the troops.'
For the next three years, relations between Grozny and Moscow remained
tense. Russia did not want to lose Chechnya for several reasons. First,
Chechnya possesses great oil wealth and several important oil pipelines cross
its territory. Second, its physical location in the Caucasus Mountains is
strategically important. Third, Moscow feared setting a precedent which
would lead to the secession of other Caucasus republics or other areas of the
Russian Federation.47 As a result of these interests, Russia imposed an
economic, transport, and diplomatic blockade on Chechnya,4s and it began to
fund Chechen groups that opposed Dudayev. These groups were not hard to
find because Dudayev's popularity had begun to wane. The economy of
Chechnya was suffering, horribly. Industrial production had fallen by more
than seventy percent; and, despite the fact that all of Chechnya's oil revenue
was staying in the country,49 "not one new school, hospital, or factory was
built" from 1992 to 1994.10 Further, there was growing evidence of a link
between Dudayev's government and organized crime. According to Salambek
Khadzhiyev, a leader of the Round Table Opposition in Grozny in 1993, "The
leadership here doesn't fight the criminal underworld, [because] it belongs to
it."5
1
Because of these factors, in the spring of 1993, the Chechen parliament
and the Grozny city council began to organize demonstrations against
Dudayev.5 2 The Chechen President's reaction was swift. He sent government
forces to storm the city council and disperse the demonstrators. Then, he
issued a decree dissolving parliament. Finally, on June 3, 1993, he shut down
Chechnya's constitutional court in retaliation for its ruling that his dismissal
of parliament was unconstitutional, and the next day he canceled a referendum
which had been scheduled to decide the issue of early elections. 3 Indeed,
46. Celestine Bohlen, Legislatures Block Yeltsin Rule of Breakaway Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991,
at Ai0.
47. Michael Specter, Russian Forces Move into the Rebel Region, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
48. Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Russia-Chechnya: A Forced Love Affair, Moscow NEwS, Nov. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, MOSNWS File.
49. Under Soviet control only 2% of Chechnya's oil revenue remained in the region. Meier, supra
note 43, at 16.
50. Id.
51. HANDELMAN, supra note 37, at 221.
52. PANICo, supra note 1, at 8-9.
53. Id.
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Dudayev's popularity was at an all-time low, and a split was forming in
Chechnya between the lowland villagers who supported the parliament and the
highland rural villagers who supported Dudayev.54
Ironically, the Russians saved Dudayev's government by funding the
armed opposition groups in Chechnya. Dudayev was able to build upon the
people's fears that the Russians were trying to subvert Chechen independence,
and the subsequent nationalist response boosted his popularity." Undaunted,
the Russians continued to support the opposition groups; and, while Moscow
denied sending anything more than money and materials, it soon became
apparent that Russian troops were actively participating in the fighting in
Chechnya." The crisis came to a head when Dudayev's forces captured at
least seventy Russian soldiers after a botched armor attack on Grozny.
Dudayev threatened to execute these men if Russia did not recognize its
military involvement in Chechnya." At first, the Russian government
continued to deny that the men were active-duty Russian soldiers. However,
on December 2, 1994, "the respected Russian daily Izvestiya in a front-page
banner story provided incontrovertible evidence of the involvement of active-
duty Russian soldiers recruited by the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence
Service, the successor to the KGB].""6 Finally, on December 4, 1994, Deputy
Defense Minister Boris Gromov, in a letter to Dudayev, admitted that the
Russian prisoners were Russian army soldiers, but denied official
involvement.5 9
Once Russian participation in the anti-Dudayev opposition had been
exposed, Yeltsin adopted a stronger stance with regard to Chechnya. On
November 29, 1995, he issued an ultimatum giving Dudayev forty-eight hours
54. Id. at 9; see also Fadin, supra note 43, at 20.
55. Jane Ormrod, The North Caucasus: Confederation in Conflict, in NEW STATES, NEw POLITICS:
BUILDING THE POST-SOVIET NATIONS 104-05 (Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras eds., 1997).
56. PA sico, supra note 1, at 14. The appearance of M-24 gunships in Chechnya, helicopters that the
opposition forces did not possess the crews to fly, was direct evidence of the Russian military's presence
in Chechnya. Id.
57. Lawrence Sheets, Chechnya Hints It May Execute "Russian Mercenaries," Reuters World
Service, Nov. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File. Dudayev stated, "If [Yeltsin]
does not recognize these soldiers as prisoners of war they will be tried by the laws of shariat [Islamic law].
•.. There is only one sentence for mercenaries [death]." Id.
58. PANICO, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Sergei Mostovshchikov, Lubyanka Verbovala Rossiiskikh
Voennykh Dlya Sekretnykh Operatsii v Chechni [Lubyanka Recruited Russian Soldiers for a Secret
Operation in Chechnya], IZVESTIYA, Dec. 2, 1994).
59. Margaret Shapiro, Russia's Week of Blunders Baffles Kremlinologists, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1994,
at 29.
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to disband his armed forces and release the prisoners. 6° This deadline passed
unnoticed; and, after talks between Dudayev and Russian Defense Minister
Pavel Grachev proved unfruitful,6' Yeltsin ordered Russian troops into
Chechnya in order to protect "the integrity of Russia, [and] the safety of its
citizens both in Chechnya and beyond its borders."62 However, despite the
importance of the operation, the Russian forces that pushed into Chechnya
were ill-prepared to accomplish the mission. Their leaders were
overconfident, 3 and the soldiers were poorly equipped, trained, and
motivated." As a result, they suffered heavy casualties; and, in an effort to
compensate for these weaknesses, the Russians began to rely on heavy artillery
and air attacks. 5 Regrettably, the Russian fire was largely indiscriminate; and,
according to Sergei Kovalev's Report to the Deputies of the State Duma, these
attacks resulted in:
(a) large-scale death and maiming of the civilian population
in Chechnya; (b) the destruction of housing and other civilian
objects indispensable for survival; (c) damage to and
disruption of medical institutions, the destruction of
ambulances and other medical conveyances, including some
marked with the Red Cross insignia; (d) the destruction of
cultural objects; (e) serious damage to installations involving
potential hazard to the environment."
60. PANico, supra note 1, at 15. See also Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra note 45.
61. PANIcO, supranote 1, at 15.
62. Text of Yeltsin's Address on Chechnya, Reuters World Service, Dec. 11, 1994 (TASS News
Agency trans.) available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File [hereinafter Invasion Address].
63. PANIco, supra note 1, at 16.
64. Addressing the abysmal condition of the Russian troops in Chechnya, Aleksandr Lebed asserted
"I suspect partisans in World War II were better clothed." The Russian servicemen he encountered were
"hungry, lice-infested and underclothed." Alessandra Stanley, Yeltsin Security Aide Denounces Russian
War Effort in Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al. Indeed, at times Russian troops have been
"forced to beg for food and melt snow on the wind-swept fields for drinking water." Michael Specter, 10
Days That Shook Russia: Siege in the Caucasus, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1996, at Al. See also Sarah Koenig,
Wordfor Word/Russian Soldiers; All Disenchanted on the Chechen Front, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, § 4,
at 7 (graphically illustrating Russian soldiers' discontent and disillusionment with the war in Chechnya).
65. PANICO, supra note 1, at 16.
66. Hearings, supra note 20, at 125 (Sergei Kovalev's Report to the Deputies of the State Duma).
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Because of the high level of civilian casualties caused by indiscriminate fire
and incidents like the Samashki massacre, 7 the Russian military alienated
villagers who otherwise would have been indifferent to the Chechen nationalist
cause." These tactics swelled the ranks of Chechnya's partisan fighters who
would continue to fight fiercely in the following years.
II. JUSAD BELLUM: THE RULES ON RESORTING TO WAR
A. United Nations Charter: Articles 2(4) & 51
After the carnage of World War II, the principal world powers sat down
and drafted the U.N. Charter. The major purposes of the Charter were "(1) To
maintain international peace and security . . . ; (2) To develop friendly
relations among nations ... ; (3) To achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems.., and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all.. . ." The founders
of the U.N. Charter perceived the greatest threat to the achievement of these
goals to be war. According to international legal scholar Louis Henkin, "[w]ar
inflicted the greatest injustice, the most serious violations of human rights, and
the most violence to self-determination and to economic and social
development."" Therefore, in order to preserve peace, the founders of the
U.N. Charter constructed an international security system, the backbone of
which was articles 2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) states: "[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.""' This
provision completely outlawed the use of force between States subject to the
very limited exception found in article 51. This article reads: "[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
67. On April 12, 1995, Russian troops entered the largely defenseless village of Samashki, which had
tried to meet the Russian demands, and killed over 200 of its unarmed civilian residents. Dmitry Balburov,
Samashki Massacre Shows Grim Reality of War, Moscow NEWS, Apr. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MOSNWS File; Steven Erlanger, Dissent on Chechnya: Word to the West, N.Y. TtMEs, Apr. 21,
1995, at A6.
68. See Balburov, supra note 67.
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, IN 1-3.
70. Henkin, supra note 11, at 40.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 2,14.
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defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."' Unfortunately, after founding the Charter
in 1945, the U.N. has experienced many problems in successfully
implementing articles 2(4) and 51." Nevertheless, articles 2(4) and 51 remain
the international community's primary regulation onjus ad bellum.
R Prohibition on the Use of Force: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
Notwithstanding the use of force in a "manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations," two criteria must be met in order to violate
article 2(4). First, both the actor and the entity against which force is used
must be States.74 Second, the actor must threaten or use force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a State. This second criteria
sparked considerable debate as to what actions constituted a use of force. To
help clear up this ambiguity, in 1974, the U.N. adopted a resolution on the
definition of aggression" that spells out what State behavior would constitute
an act of aggression and violate article 2(4). The resolution states that "[t]he
first use of armed force by a State76 in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute primafacie evidence of an act of aggression... ." It then goes on
to list specific acts of aggression. Of these acts, the most relevant to the case
at hand are the following:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of
the territory of another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
73. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 34-46 (1993).
74. With regard to the actors, the text of article 2(4) says that "all members," not States, shall refrain
from the use of force. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. However, the requirement of Statehood is more accurate
because all members of the U.N. must be States (See U.N. CHARTER art. 4, 11), and article 2(6) dictates that
article 2(4) can be enforced against non-member States. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 16.
75. Definilion ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
76. An explanatory note to article I of the Resolution states that in this definition the term "state" "[i]s
used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United Nations."
Id. at 143 (art. 2).
77. Id. (art. 2).
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any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein.7"
After the adoption of the Resolution of the Definition ofAggression, what
constituted a "use of force" under article 2(4) became clearer. However,
despite article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter, it was still uncertain whether the
prohibition of the use of force enumerated in article 2(4) applied to all States.
In 1986, the I.C.J. clarified this question in Nicaragua v. US. In this decision,
the court stated that the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) reflects
customary international law; therefore, it applies to all States79 and constitutes
jus cogens.Y° Consequently, despite the fact that Chechnya is not a member of
the U.N., the prohibition on the threat or use of force contained in article 2(4)
applies in its relations with Russia if Chechnya is a State, an issue that I
address below.
1. State Conflict or an Internal Affair?
The first criterion for the application of article 2(4) is that both of the
parties involved must be States. In the case at hand, Russia is clearly a State,
but Chechnya's status is far from obvious. Currently, international legal
theory recognizes two primary tests to determine whether an entity like
Chechnya is a State. These two tests are the constitutive and the declaratory
theories of statehood.8
78. Id. (art. 3, a, art. 3, 1 g). The l.C.J. stated that article 3(g) "may be taken to reflect customary
international law." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 93 (June 27).
79. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 17, 82-86.
80. Id. at 91-92. Many commentators have criticized the I.C.J.'s decision that art. 2(4) represents
customary international law. See Alberto R. Coil, The Limits of Global Consciousness and Legal
Absolutism: Protecting International Law from Some of Its Best Friends, 27 HARv. INT'L L.J., 599, 620
(1986); Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1987); Thomas
M. Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 116
(1987).
81. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (3d ed. 1993).
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According to the constitutive theory, an entity is not a State unless other
States have recognized it.8" Under this theory, Chechnya obviously does not
qualify for statehood because no State has recognized it since its declaration
of independence in 1991." Unlike the constitutive theory, however, the
declaratory theory is not centered around recognition by other States. Instead,
according to this theory, a State must satisfy four criteria: "a) a permanent
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with other States."" In the case of Chechnya, each of these four
criteria will be examined.
First, Chechnya possesses a permanent population. The Chechen people
have lived in the territory claimed by the Dudayev government for thousands
of years." Further, they make up a majority of the population," and they do
not identify themselves as Russians.8 Rather, they have continually fought for
their own independence, and view themselves as a separate people."
Second, with regard to defined territory, international law does not
prescribe a minimum required area. 9 In addition, when the U.N. granted Israel
membership, it gave credence to Philip C. Jessup's argument that in order to
have territory, an entity was not required to have definite or fixed borders."
82. Id.
83. Despite the fact that no country has officially recognized Chechnya, both Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait have offered to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Yemelyanenko, supra note 48. Also,
the Estonian parliament urged its government to recognize Chechnya "at the first available opportunity as
soon as the international situation makes it possible." Russian Duma Condemns Estonian Support for
Chechnya, Reuters World Service, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
84. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. Despite the fact that the Montevideo Convention was
an Inter-American treaty, many international jurists recognize it as the basic list of criteria for statehood.
See ROSALYN IGGrNS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1963); States, Territories, and Governments, I Whiteman DIGEST § 14, at 230
(quoting Philip C. Jessup, as U.S. Representative to the U.N. Security Council, Dec. 2, 1948).
85. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The only time the Chechens have not lived in
Chechnya was when they were forcibly deported by Stalin. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
87. Ormrod, supra note 55, at 103 (pointing out that "Chechens express pride in their aggressive
resistance to Russian encroachment and in their retention of their language and culture in the face of pressure
to assimilate."). Id.
88. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. "The Chechens longed for the day when they
could be free from Russian domination and be able to exercise their God-given right of self-determination.
When Communist Russia collapsed, they saw a window of opportunity to fulfill their long-awaited dream
of independence." Hearings, supra note 20, at 10 (quoting Mohammed Shashani, President, Chechen-
Ingush Society of America).
89. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 248.
90. States, Territories, and Governments, supra note 84 at 231. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 73 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing the recognition of Albania in 1913, despite
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Despite the fact that Chechnya's borders are not completely fixed, it still meets
the requirement of a defined territory because before the Russian invasion,
from November 2, 1991 until December 11, 1994, the Chechen government
had complete political and military control over some land."' Further, on July
23, 1993, "the Presidents of the Chechen Republic and the Ingush Republic
signed a treaty 'On the Principles for Determining the Boundaries of [the
Republics'] Territories. ' ' 2 Even though in the treaty the parties pledge "not
to establish a state border between Chechnya and Ingushetia,"'3 the existence
of the treaty demonstrates that Ingushetia recognizes that Chechnya has
territory. As a result of these factors, it is evident that Chechnya meets the
second requirement of statehood.
Third, in order to satisfy the requirement of effective government, a stable
political organization must be created in which the public authorities have
become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the
State.94 Further, this standard is applied stringently to a State formed by
secession.95 After the declaration of independence in 1991, Chechnya
possessed all the organs necessary to have an effective government. The office
of the president, the parliament, and the court system had already been firmly
established under Communism. Now, these bodies were simply operating
under different names, free from the influence of Moscow.
One fact that seems to indicate a lack of effective government is the
internal opposition to the Dudayev regime. However, until 1994, the Dudayev
government was in complete control of Chechnya; and, while there was
antagonism between the parliament and the president, this antagonism did not
undermine the government's control of the country. In 1994, four different
armed opposition groups rose up against Dudayev's regime, but the popularity
a lack of settled frontiers).
91. Occupation by a foreign power does not deprive a State of the criteria of territory and render it
not a State. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt.
b (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Therefore, if it is shown that Chechnya meets the four criteria of the
declaratory theory, it was not stripped of its Statehood by the subsequent Russian invasion. For example,
Kuwait continued to be a State despite the Iraqi occupation in 1990. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 247.
92. Natalya Pachegina, What Do We Need with that Sinking Ship Russia?, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA,
July 24, 1993, at 3 (condensed text), reprinted in 45 CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, No. 30, at
29, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File (Aug. 25, 1993).
93. Id.
94. 4 LEAGUE OFNATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 4, at 8-9 (1920) (Commission of Jurists on Aaland Islands
Dispute).
95. James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 1976-1977 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 93, 120.
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of these groups was generally limited to their own native areas, and the total
number of militia of all four groups was only 2,000 men." Further, except for
one joint push towards Grozny,l these groups never seriously challenged the
Chechen government. Therefore, Chechnya has met the government
requirement because the Dudayev government has been able to control the
country effectively.""
Finally, in addition to being able to assert itself domestically, a State must
have "competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct
international relations with other States, as well as the political, technical and
financial capabilities to do so." The Chechen government has a foreign
minister,"°° and it has demonstrated its ability to conduct foreign relations with
other States through two events. First, the Chechen government negotiated
and signed a treaty with the government of the Ingush Republic.' 0' Second, the
fact that both Saudi Arabian King Fahd and the Emir of Kuwait, Jaber al-
Ahmad as-Sabah, offered to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya is
evidence that at least these two countries believed the Chechen republic is
capable of conducting foreign relations."r
Based on the above analysis, Chechnya has met the four criteria of
statehood. Consequently, Chechnya is a State. This finding differs from that
of the constitutive theory. However, the finding of the declaratory theory
trumps that of the constitutive theory because it carries more weight with the
international legal community. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states
that "[t]he political existence of a State is independent of recognition by the
other States."' 3 Further:
It is clear that an entity that meets the conditions of statehood
cannot, because of the lack of recognition, be denied its rights
or escape its obligations. "Its territory cannot be considered
96. PANICO, supra note 1, at 11-13. This number is a very rough approximation.
97. Id. at 13.
98. When the Russians invaded and the formal institutions of the Chechen government were unable
to rule effectively, Chechnya was not rendered a non-state because a "breakdown of order through foreign
invasion... [is] not considered to affect [the State's] personality." BROWNLIE, spra note 90, at 73.
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, at § 201 cmt. e.
100. Yemelyanenko, supra note 48. In 1993, Shamsutgin Yusef served in this capacity. Id.
101. Pachegina, supra note 92. "Delegations from the [United States], France, Belgium, Lebanon and
Turkey were present at the treaty-signing ceremony." Id.
102. Yemelyanenko, supra note 48. General Dudayev turned down these proposals maintaining that
Russia must first recognize Chechnya. Id.
103. Montevideo Convention, supra note 84, at art. 3.
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to be no-man's-land; there is no right to overfly without
permission; ships flying its flag cannot be considered
stateless, and so on."'"24
The conclusion that Chechnya is a State is strengthened in light of current
events. In September 1996, Aleksandr Lebed and then-Chechen separatist
Chief of Staff Asian Maskhadov signed a peace agreement. 105 The terms of
this agreement called for the status of Chechnya to be resolved before
December 31, 2001, and in vague language it suggests "that the Chechen
people will be able to determine their own future in accordance with the
'norms of international law,' . . . ." The wording of this document has
alarmed many Russians because "Chechnya's future status is to be defined by
international law, not the Russian Constitution." ' 7 Many Chechens have
argued that Chechnya is outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.
The Chechens did not participate in the referendum confirming the Russian
constitution, and a vast majority of Chechens boycotted the July 1996 Russian
presidential election.' Now, with the reference to international law, the
Russians for the first time seem to acknowledge that Chechnya is outside of
their jurisdiction.
Another aspect of the accord is that all Russian troops were to withdraw
from Chechnya before January 27, 1997.' 0 This action makes the excitement
over the "international law" language in the treaty almost moot because, as
some Russian commentators and Said-Khasan Abumuslimov, vice-president
to Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, have pointed out, "[a] troop
withdrawal .. .virtually assure[s] Chechen independence, whether Russia
recognize[s] it or not."' " Indeed, since the signing of the peace accord, all
104. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 245 (quoting Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International Law,
in MAN JAL OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw 269 (Sorenson ed., 1968). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 90,
88-91.
105. See Michael R. Gordon, Chechen Peace Pact Draws Fire in Kremlin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996,
at Al 1.
106. Id.
107. Paul Goble, The Chechen War in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at A17.
108. Carlotta Gall, Chechens Insist on Statehood, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 20, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MOSTMS File.
109. Michael R. Gordon, Yeltsin Orders Withdrawal of Troops in Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1996, § 1, at 4.
110. Gall, supra note 108; Vadim Makarenko, Drawing Conclusions from the Chechen Experience:
State Duma May Need to Create a Constitutional Mechanism for Secession from the Federation,
RoSSIISKIYE VESTI, Nov. 30, 1996, at 2 (condensed text), reprinted in 48 CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SOvIET PRESS, no. 48, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File (Dec. 25, 1996).
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signs of the "puppet government installed by Moscow [have] vanished," and
"[t]he traditional green Chechen flag of the lone wolf flies over every battle-
scarred town hall in the shattered republic."'II
Also, certain members of the international community have become more
open in their acceptance of Chechnya as an entity apart from Russia. Pakistan,
Jordan, and Iran "have each sent emissaries and cash to help guide the republic
.... ,2 The Chechen government has opened a "mission" in Turkey, which
is an embassy in all but name, and it plans to open several other official
"missions" soon in Jordan and the Baltic Republics." 3 In Warsaw, the
Chechen government opened a new Chechen Information Center at which
"Polish political figures played an active role in a so-called Chechen flag-
raising ceremony."" 4
The last and most recent event that demonstrates Chechen statehood is the
free elections that were held in Chechnya in January 1997.'" With these
elections, the people selected a new president and parliament-graphically
illustrating to the world that they do possess the governmental organs
necessary to be a State. The new Chechen President, Asian Maskhadov, has
vowed to settle for nothing less than full independence from Russia, and he has
the overwhelming support of the Chechen people behind him."6
In addition to its compliance with the four criteria of the declaratory theory
and the added perspective of current events, the concept of self-determination
bolsters Chechnya's claim of statehood. The concept of a right to self-
determination is embodied in articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter "as the
principle of 'equal rights and self-determination of peoples."' ' 7 Over the
years, other documents expressed the idea with greater clarity. In the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
111. Michael Specter, In War-Ravaged Chechnya, Russia's Presence Is Fading, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
1, 1996, at Al.
112. Id.
113. Gennady Charodeyev, Flag of Ichkeria Over the Bosporous?, IZVESTIA, Dec. 4, 1996, at 3
(condensed text), reprinted in 48 CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, no. 49, at 22, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File (Jan. 1, 1997).
114. Leonid Kornilov, Chechen Flag Raised Over Warsaw: Move Angers Moscow and Could Have
Serious Complications, IZVEsTIA, Dec. 15, 1996, at I, 3 (condensed text), reprinted in 48 CuRRENT DIG. OF
THE POST-SOvIET PRESS, no. 50, at 22, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File (Jan. 8, 1997).
115. Alessandra Stanley, Military Chief in Chechnya Says He Won Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1997, at A4.
116. Id.
117. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 304, 304 (1994) [hereinafter Kirgis, Degrees of Determination].
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and Co-operation among States (Declaration on Friendly Relations), the U.N.
General Assembly stated:
[The] subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of
self-determination], as well as a denial of fundamental human
rights .... [T]he emergence into any ... political status
freely determined by a people constitute[s] [a] [mode] of
implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of
the present principle of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence."'
Despite the drafters' strong statements regarding the right to self-
determination, however, they were careful to add that the disruption of the
territorial integrity of States was not encouraged. To this end, they put forth
the following disclaimer:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as
to race, creed or colour."9
118. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
at 124, U.N. Doec. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
119. Id Several other documents have concurred with the sentiments of this disclaimer. See Vienna
Declaration and Programme ofAction, pt. I. at 3, U.N. Doec. A/CONF. 157/24 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration].
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In other words, according to the Declaration on Friendly Relations, a group
only has a right to self-determination if the government of the territory fails to
represent the whole people without distinction as to race, creed, or color.20
The Declaration on Friendly Relations and the other documents pertaining
to self-determination are non-binding instruments. Nevertheless, Frederic
Kirgis contends that "they purport to, and probably do, reflect an opiniojuris.
In the human rights field, a strong showing of opinio juris may overcome a
weak demonstration of state practice to establish a customary rule."'' Further,
it is widely held that "the right to be free from alien colonial control is an
established rule of international law."' " However, whether the concept of self-
determination applies to Chechnya and whether Chechnya can avoid the
disclaimer clause of the Declaration on Friendly Relations is not as clear.
Therefore, in order to determine if the Chechen people have a right to self-
determination, I will evaluate Chechnya's claim using Kirgis' analytical
model.
According to Kirgis, who identified the key variables in the Declaration
on Friendly Relations and the 1993 Vienna Declaration, whether a people
have a recognizable claim to self-determination depends on the
representativeness of the current government and the degree of destabilization
the recognition would cause." The relationship between these two variables
is depicted by the graph in Figure 1.
120. The disclaimer embodied in the Vienna Declaration broadened "without distinction as to race,
creed, or color" to "without distinction of any kind." Vienna Declaration, supra note 119, at 22.
121. Kirgis, Degrees of Determination, supra note 117, at 306; see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom
on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146 (1987). But see Coil, supra note 79; D'Amato, supra note 80;
Franck, supra note 80; Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, & General Principles 1988-1989 AUsm. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 89.
122. Kirgis, Degrees of Determination, supra note 117, at 308.
123. Id. at 308-10.
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Degree to which the
claim is destabilizing
Right is not
recognized
Right is
recognized
+
Degree to which the government is representative
FIGURE 1. LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS' 24
The vertical axis measures "the degree to which a particular self-determination
claim is destabilizing,.... based on circumstances and experience at the time
when the claim is made," while the horizontal axis measures "the degree to
which the particular government is representative,. . . essentially a question
of fact.""2 The point where the degrees of destabilization and government
representativeness intersect determines whether Chechnya has a recognizable
claim of self-determination. 26
With regard to the first factor, a Chechen right to self-determination could
greatly destabilize the Caucasus region. This region contains three
independent States, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and several smaller
124. This graph is a copy of the graph Kirgis used in his article. Id. at 309.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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autonomous republics, like Chechnya.'" Further, it is home for "dozens of
peoples, many with their own distinct languages."' 28 This fact has created the
strong possibility that Chechen self-determination will lead to the
"Balkanization" of the Russian Federation. 29 Many of these peoples were
"colonized" at the same time as Chechnya, and have also at times vigorously
resisted Russian control.
30
Another reason it is likely that Chechen self-determination will destabilize
the area is that Stalin drew many of the current borders with the intent to dilute
rather than unite local populations."' Compounding that problem, a great
number of Slavs also live in this region, and frequently they live in areas where
the majority of the inhabitants are of another ethnic background.
Consequently, a situation like the one in the former Yugoslavia could arise in
which the Slavic minority groups would break away from already established
States, like Azerbaijan, leading to the total fragmentation of the area.32 In
response to this possibility, James Collins, Senior Coordinator in the Office of
127. Anthony Hyman, Chechnya: War and Human Rights, Crosslines: Global Rep. (1995)
<http://carryon.oneworld.org/crosslines/crosslinesredarmy.html> (on file with author).
128. Id.
129. Id Recently, events in the Caucasus have lent greater credence to the potential "Balkanization"
of the Russiin Federation and the surrounding republics. See Dmitry Kamyshev, The Chechen Example
Could Become Contagious, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Nov. 20, 1996, at 1, 3 (condensed text), reprinted in
CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 25, 1996, vol. XLVIII, no. 47, at 15, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CDSP File (discussing the Balkar national congress's announcement of the formation of the
sovereign Republic of Balkaria within Russia); Aleksandr Koretsky & Georgy Dvali, Former Soviet Colony
in the Role of a Mini-Empire, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Nov. 18, 1996, at 4 (condensed text), reprinted in
CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 18, 1996, vol. XLVIII, no. 47, at 20, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CDSP File (pointing out that the stubborn Chechen resistance encourages other national
groups to solve their problems through armed resistance and without concession); The War in Chechnya Is
Over. Is Dagestan Next?, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Nov. 19, 1996, at I, 3 (excerpts), reprinted in CURRENT
DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 11, 1996, vol. XLVIII, no. 46, at 15, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CDSP File (identifying communist leader Gennady Zyuganov's concerns regarding the spread of
violence from Chechnya into Dagestan). One should note, however, that the economic and resource
dependencies that exist between the periphery areas and the Russian center serve as a deterrent to
"Balkanization." See KAREN DAWISHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA: THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1994) (illustrating the lingering dependencies that exist between the Newly
Independent States and Russia).
130. See generally Ormrod, supra note 55 (discussing the history of each of the national groups in the
North Caucasus region).
131. Erlanger, supra note 17, at A14.
132. Recently, this fear came close to being realized when "Viktor Zaitsev, a member of the Terek
Cossacks in Russia's southern Stavropol region, [warned]... that his people consider the northern part of
Chechnya their own land .... Zaitsev said, "'We will fight for it just like the Chechens have fought for
land they regard as their own, with mothers and children holding hunting rifles."' Dmitry Zaks, Cossack
Representative Asserts Will to Defend Chechen Land, MOSCOW TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1997, available in LE)US,
News Library, MOSTMS File.
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the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States, warned, "If open to
a sort of absolute principle that any people has a right to its own state, a part
of the world may begin to unravel in a way which I think has no foreseeable
end and is very dangerous."'' Similarly, former U.N. Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that "if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group
claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace,
security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to
achieve.' 1 34 In summary, recognizing the Chechen claim to self-determination
could be extremely destabilizing. However, where Chechnya lies in relation
to the curve in Kirgis' model cannot be determined until the representativeness
of the Russian government is evaluated.
There is a great deal of evidence which illustrates that the Russian
government does not represent the concerns of the Chechen people. First, like
the territories of the colonial era at which the Declaration of Friendly
Relations is aimed, the Chechens were a subjugated people. Imperial Russia
was not concerned with the needs and desires of the Chechens. Consequently,
the Russian government did not represent these needs. Second, the continual
wars of independence which the Chechens fought against the Russians are
primafacie evidence that the Russians were not adequately representing the
Chechens. If they were, then it is more likely than not that the continual cycle
of fighting would not have occurred.
Third, the way the Russians treated the Chechens illustrates that the
government does not represent them. In Chechnya, when the Russians were
in control, the Chechen people were the victims of widespread job and
educational discrimination. Further, they were under-employed in the skilled
trades and utilized primarily as migrant farmers.' In Russia, the Chechens
and other ethnic groups from the Caucasus are frequently viewed as inferior
or as criminals. 36 Many Russians refer derogatorily to the people of the
Caucasus as chornye, "blacks,""' and members of conservative Russian
organizations consider them to be a desecration to basic Russian values. 3 1
This general sentiment against the Chechens and other similar ethnic groups
133. Hearings, supra note 20, at 63 (statement of James F. Collins, Senior Coordinator in the Office
of the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States).
134. Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. S/24111, 117 (1992) (Boutros Boutros-Ghali).
135. PANico, supra note 1, at 4.
136. Hearings, supra note 20, at 88-89 (prepared testimony of Paul A. Goble, Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
137. HANDELMAN, supra note 37, at 302.
138. Id.
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has translated into direct government action. In October 1993, the Russian
government launched "Operation Signal" in Moscow. The purpose of this
joint police and military operation was to crackdown on crime. However,
contrary to its stated purpose, the action led to the expulsion of numerous dark-
skinned persons. 39 According to human rights activists, anyone who looked
non-Russian had become a target, and Steven Handelman described the
operation as giving "full expression to Russian frustration over rising crime,
not to mention simmering xenophobia and racial prejudice."'"
As the evidence above illustrates, the Russian government does not
represent the concerns of the Chechen people. Consequently, I maintain,
contrary to general international opinion, 4' that Chechnya has a recognizable
claim of self-determination. In other words, with regard to the graph below,
I contend that it is possible that Chechnya is located beneath the curve. This
conclusion is warranted because, based on the evidence above, it is reasonable
to assume that the Russian government is less representative than a
hypothetical average State government. On balance, this low level of
representativeness compensates for the fact that Chechnya's claim of
sovereignty is more destabilizing than a hypothetical average claim of
sovereignty. As a result of this assumption, Chechnya may be located beneath
the curve because it lies in the range represented by the gray square below.
Therefore, as Figure 2 depicts, Chechnya has a recognizable claim of self-
determination because of the unrepresentative nature of the Russian
government.
139. See id. at 290.
140. Id Operation Signal was not a singular event. Another expulsion took place in the summer of
1994. Both of these actions constituted violations of human rights severe enough for the U.S. government
to express strong concern. Hearings, supra note 20, at 106 (answers of James F. Collins, Senior Coordinator
in the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States, to questions for the record
submitted by Chairman Smith).
141. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2. CHECHNYA'S SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIM142
Moreover, Chechnya's recognizable claim of sovereignty is bolstered by
the following three arguments. First, the situation in Chechnya is similar to
that of the instances of colonial domination which occurred in Africa, Asia,
and the Caribbean because Russia and the Soviet Union subjugated the
Chechen people through military means and exploited the territory for its
strategic and economic value. 43 Therefore, the right to be free from alien
control, a customary rule of international law,'" should apply, even though
Chechnya is trying to secede from within the currently recognized territory of
142. This graph and the lines and points on it are not based on statistical evidence or specific factual
research. Rather, it is merely a visual aid to assist the reader and demonstrate that it is possible that
Chechnya's claim of self-determination is recognizable.
143. See supra notes 22-39, 47 and accompanying text.
144. Kirgis, Degrees of Determination, supra note 117, at 308.
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Russia. Second, as demonstrated by the facts above, the disclaimer provision
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations does not apply to Chechnya. The
government of Russia does not represent "the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour."' 5 Third, international
precedent indicates that Chechnya has a right to self-determination. Both the
European Union (E.U.) and the United States recognized the new States of the
former Yugoslavia.Y This recognition implicitly condoned their right to self-
determination. In the former Yugoslavia, the potential for violent
destabilization was just as obvious as in the case of Chechnya, especially
because at the time the E.U. and the United States recognized Bosnia, fighting
had already erupted in Slovenia and Croatia. Based on these precedents, one
could contend that Chechnya has a recognizable right to self-determination.
In summary, due to the fact that Chechnya has satisfied the four criteria of
the declaratory theory; and due to its arguably recognizable claim of self-
determination, the conflict in Chechnya has met the first requirement of article
2(4). The Chechen conflict is a war between States. 47
2. A Use of Force?
In addition to being a conflict between States, in order for article 2(4) to
apply there must be a "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state .... ,' Since Chechnya declared its
independence, there have been five Russian actions that may be classified as
violations of customary international law. In the following discussion, I
examine each of these events and determine not only if they constitute a threat
or a use of force according to article 2(4), but also if these actions were armed
attacks entitling the Chechens to a right of self-defense under article 51.149
First, on November 2, 1991, shortly after Dudayev declared Chechen
independence, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent 650 troops to Chechnya
145. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 118, at 124. The disclaimer definitely does not
apply if the broader Vienna Declaration terms are used. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146. HENKi ET AL., supra note 81, at 252-53.
147. For other analyses of whether Chechnya is a State, see Hollis, supra note 20, at 815-16 (finding
that under the declarative view, Chechnya has a legitimate claim of Statehood); Trent N. Tappe, Chechnya
and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the
Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 255 (1995) (finding that Chechnya's claim
to Statehood is valid).
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
149. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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to restore order."s These troops arrived in Grozny, but they did not leave their
camps. Nine days later, they returned to Russia.'' This action can be
classified as a use of force. The Russian troops violated the territorial integrity
of Chechnya. In addition, article 3(a) of the Definition of Aggression states
that "[t]he invasion ... by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State" is an act of aggression (a use of force). " The Russian action
was an invasion because the Russian soldiers were sent there with the express
intent to deprive Chechnya of its political independence.
The Russian action was also an armed attack. In Nicaragua v. US., the
I.C.J. maintained that an armed attack occurs when a State sends its regular
armed forces across an international border.' The deployment of troops into
the outskirts of the capital of an independent State meets the definition of an
armed attack given by the I.C.J. However, since the Chechen right to self-
defense must be proportional to the Russian violation,"' its right to respond
was limited. "
The next action the Russian government took was to fund and supply the
armed opposition groups in Chechnya from 1993-94. In Nicaragua v. US.,
the I.C.J. stated that "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of
weapons or logistical or other support [does not constitute an armed attack.
Rather, s]uch assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount
to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States." 56 The
determination of whether it is a use of force or intervention depends on the
scope of the assistance.'" In Nicaragua v. US., Nicaragua accused the United
States of "recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and.
• . directing military and paramilitary actions" against the Nicaraguan
government.' Concerning these claims, the court found that the United States
150. One potential counter argument to my analysis is that Chechen statehood had not solidified when
Russian troops were deployed to Grozny in 1991. While the exact moment when Chechnya "became" a
State is impossible to identify, the fact that the Chechen government was able to mount a defense and repel
the Russian incursion illustrates that the Chechen government was in control of the people and the territory
at this time. Other evidence that the Chechen declaration of independence created a State can be found in
current events. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
152. Definition ofAggression, supra note 75, at 143 (art. 3, 1 a).
153. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at 103 (1 195).
154. Id. at 94( 175).
155. In this instance, the Chechen threat to shoot any Russian soldiers who left their camps was a
proportional and legitimate response. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
156. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 104 (1 195).
157. Fidler, supra note 8, at 68.
158. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 18 (1 15, sub-1. a).
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had supplied aid to the rebels (Contras)," 9 and it held that the United States
assistance constituted an intervention into the internal affairs of Nicaragua.
However, it was not a use of force.'
In the case of Chechnya, the Russian aid given to the anti-Dudayev
opposition groups was in some ways greater than the aid the United States
gave to the Contras. The Russians supplied the rebels with large sums of
money and military hardware, including helicopters;"' but, like the situation
in Nicaragua, the Chechen rebels were not dependent on Russian aid.
Moreover, the assistance was not enough to turn the tide of the conflict in the
favor of the rebels. 62 Consequently, based on the precedent of the Nicaragua
case, the Russian support of the Chechen opposition groups was not a use of
force. Instead, it constituted an intervention into the internal affairs of
Chechnya.
Over time, however, the nature of the Russian involvement with the
Chechen opposition groups changed. By August of 1994, it had escalated to
the point where it was no longer a mere intervention. Instead, it constituted a
separate action. Around this date, helicopter gunships exclusive to the Russian
military began engaging targets in Chechnya' 63 Shortly thereafter, Dudayev's
forces captured at least seventy Russian soldiers in Grozny, and the Russian
newspaper Izvestiya exposed them as active-duty Russian army personnel who
had been recruited by the FSK.'"
Unlike the Russian government's earlier involvement with the Chechen
opposition groups, this action was undeniably a use of force in violation of
customary international law. Moreover, it was an armed attack. In Nicaragua
v. US., the I.C.J. stated that a violation of article 3(g) of the Definition of
Aggression constituted an armed attack and violated customary international
law.'65 In other words, an armed attack occurs when "a state organizes, equips,
and sends armed bands into another state's territory that, because of the scale
and impact of the military activity, would be an armed attack if undertaken by
regular military forces."'" In this instance, the Russian soldiers signed a
159. Id. at 62-63 (In 110-12).
160. Id. at 119 ( 228).
161. PANico, supra note 1, at 12-14.
162. Id. at 10.
163. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
165. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at 103 (1 195).
166. Fidler, supra note 8, at 68.
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contract with the FSK, a branch of the Russian government 67 The FSK then
equipped the men and sent them to Chechnya where they staged an armor
assault on Grozny, an action which would clearly constitute an armed attack
if undertaken by regular military forces.
Because this action was an armed attack, Chechnya had a right to self-
defense, as long as it was necessary and proportional. The Chechen use of
force was justified because it was necessary to defend Grozny and it was
proportional to the force against which it was used. However, after the capture
of the soldiers, Dudayev threatened to kill them unless Moscow recognized
that they were Russian troops. 6 This threat by Dudayev was not justified as
self-defense because it was not necessary. The attack had been repelled.
Further, the argument that it was necessary to threaten the lives of the soldiers
in order to expose the Russian participation in the conflict to the world and to
deter future involvement is not valid because anticipatory self-defense is
limited by the standard enunciated in the Caroline Case, and Dudayev's
actions did not meet this standard. 69 Therefore, the Chechen threat could not
be justified as self-defense, but that fact does not mean that it was an illegal
threat of force.
According to Brownlie, "[i]f the promise is to resort to force in conditions
in which no justification for the use of force exists, the threat itself is
illegal."' 0 Further, Oscar Schachter has stated, "A blatant and direct threat of
force to compel another State to yield territory or make substantial political
concessions (not required by law) would have to be seen as illegal under
Article 2(4), if the words 'threat of force' are to have any meaning."'' In the
case at hand, Dudayev threatened to use force against soldiers in order to
167. PANICO, supra note I, at 15. NTV, an independent television broadcast company, interviewed
three of the captured soldiers who said, "[wie signed a contract through the FSK." Id Many others left
letters which acknowledged these contracts. Id.
168. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
169. Max Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634-35
(1982). After the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, several delegates to the U.N. Security
Council rejected Israel's anticipatory self-defense argument based on the fact that it did not meet the
requirements for self-defense found in the Caroline Case. Id. Schachter maintains that in 1842, U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in a diplomatic note to the British, expressed the conditions of the right
to anticipatory self-defense when he asserted that self-defense was permissible when "the necessity of that
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
Id With regard to Dudayev's threat, it was not justifiable as an act of self-defense because its necessity was
not instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice. Rather than threaten the lives of the men, Dudayev could
have pursued numerous other policy options.
170. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 364, 431.
171. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (1991).
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compel Russia to concede that the soldiers were members of the Russian army.
This threat required Russia to act against its interests and recognize the troops.
Consequently, it was adverse to Russia's political independence.
Nevertheless, it is still not clear that Dudayev's actions violated article 2(4)
because at the time of his comments a use of force against the prisoners may
have been justified.
According to the 1949 Geneva Convention III and articles 43-47 of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, captors must afford special treatment and
protection to prisoners of war.17 However, these rules do not extend to
mercenaries. 73 At the time Dudayev threatened to kill the soldiers, the Russian
government disavowed any responsibility for the prisoners' activities. In fact,
Russia maintained that the men were mercenaries. 74 Thus, Dudayev's
comments did not constitute an illegal threat of force because the captured
soldiers were "mercenaries," and the Chechen government would have been
fully within its rights to try them according to Islamic law and sentence them
to death.
The fourth Russian action that may have constituted an illegal threat of
force took place on November 29, 1994 when Yeltsin massed troops on
Chechnya's borders and threatened to use force if Dudayev did not disband his
armed forces and release all prisoners within forty-eight hours.'7 ' This threat
was an illegal threat to use force under article 2(4) because it directly
endangered both Chechnya's territorial integrity and its political independence.
With regard to whether this threat constituted an armed attack, it obviously did
not. Nevertheless, it still may have given the Chechens a right to self-defense.
The international legal status of anticipatory self-defense is unclear, 76 but
while there is no established consensus in support of the permissibility of
anticipatory self-defense, "there is certainly not a consensus opposed to it.""
Further, it is unrealistic to expect that a country will wait before taking action
when enemy forces are massing at its borders. Thus, in 1967, when Egyptian
172. HILAIRE MCCOUMBREY & NIGEL WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 268
(1992).
173. Id at 269.
174. Michael Specter, Yeltsin Threatens Action on Warring Secessionist Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1994, at A3.
175. PANICO, supra note 1, at 15.
176. See AREND & BECK, supra note 73, at 72-79, 259-60 n.45.
177. Id. at 79.
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President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba
and Israel attacked, the international community's reaction was mixed. 7
In the case of Chechnya, at the time of the threat, Russian forces were
massing at the Chechen border.'" Yeltsin's threat reinforced the general
perception that these forces were not massing on the border for peaceful
purposes. Therefore, in line with the Israeli attack in 1967, a Chechen attack
on the Russian forces after the threat may have been justified. Regardless,
Yeltsin's threat was illegal under customary international law.
The final Russian action obviously was an illegal use of force under article
2(4) and an armed attack. On December 11, 1994, Russian troops moved into
Chechnya and advanced on Grozny, thereby infringing on Chechnya's
territorial integrity and political independence. The Russian assault was a
clear act of aggression and violated numerous provisions of the Definition of
Aggression." As a result of this assault, the Russian government provided the
international community with an incontrovertible example of its use of force
in Chechnya.
In summary, of the five Russian actions analyzed above, four constituted
illegal threats or uses of force, and three of those four were serious enough to
be deemed armed attacks. Despite the Russian actions, however, the
international community has not tried to apply the principles ofjus ad bellum
to Russia. Instead, it has adhered firmly to the position that Chechnya is an
internal affair; and, as a result, world leaders have had no occasion to apply the
rules."' However, in light of the above arguments, it should be clear that the
issue is not black and white. Therefore, there must be other considerations
behind the international community's decision.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S GAMBLE
A. Weighing the Odds
178. ANTONIO CASSESSE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE 36 (S.J.K. Greenleaves trans.,
1988). See also Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David Scheffer eds., 1991). Gardner states, "I think
most people felt that [the Israeli attack in 1967] was justified self-defense." Id. at 51-52.
179. Sheets, supra note 57.
180. Definition of Aggression, supra note 75. Specifically, the Russian assault violated paragraphs
a, b, d & e of article 3 of the Definition ofAggression. Id. at 142.
181. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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When making their decision whether to apply the principles of jus ad
bellum, world leaders had more to consider than simply if Chechnya met the
four requirements of the declaratory theory. In particular, members of the
international community, especially the United States and the E.U., had to
worry about their relationship with Russia and the stability of the Caucasus
region.
After the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union, Russia tried
to rejuvenate its crippled economy by embracing capitalism and democracy.
Today, while Russia's economy shows signs of future improvement,"' the
country is currently suffering from soaring poverty, crime, corruption," 3 and
a genuine lack of leadership. 84 As a result of these problems, the Russian
people "believe the government has much to answer for.""'  While some
commentators have asserted that a return to a more authoritarian government
in Russia is farfetched,"6 the Communists did win in almost every region of
Russia in the December 1995 State Duma election;" 7 and in the July 1996
Presidential election, the Communists received forty percent of the vote."'
These election results indicate that a large portion of the population are
derzhavniki, or proponents of a strong State. "'
With regard to Chechnya, Moscow has consistently maintained that it is
an internal matter,"9 and the derzhavniki in the Russian government have stood
firmly behind Yeltsin's decision to invade.'"' If the members of the
182. David Remnick, Can Russia Change?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 35, 48 (discussing
RICHARD LAYARD & JOHN PARKER, THE COMING RUSSIAN BOOM: A GUIDE TO NEW MARKETS AND
POLITICS (1996)).
183. Id at 37. See also Peter Daniel DiPaola, The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect
of the Russian Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 145 (1996).
184. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been ill and virtually incapacitated since he was reelected
in July of 1996. His illness has left Russia without a dynamic leader. Michael Specter, Rudderless Russia:
Melancholy Mires with Bravado, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at A3. As Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged,
"[l]ilness in power leads to danger." Remnick, supra note 182, at 44.
185. Remnick, supra note 182, at 37.
186. Id. at48.
187. Michael Specter, Anger Got the Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at AS.
188. Russia's Daunting Future, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1996, at 43.
189. Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Dealing With a Russia in Turmoil, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1996, at 38,
42. "Russian nationalists, including communists, often describe themselves as derzhavniki . I..." ld
190. Summarizing the Russian position on Chechnya, Valentin Kovalyov, deputy chairman of the
State Duma, said, "I am against the internationalization of this conflict. It is an internal affair of the Russian
state." Hecker, supra note 14.
191. Hearings, supra note 20, at 6 (statement of Dr. Elwna Bonner, President of the Sakharov
Foundation).
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international community were to accuse Russia of violating the principles of
jus ad bellum, they would be explicitly recognizing Chechnya's declaration of
independence because jus ad bellum only applies to State-to-State conflict.
Further, recognition "would suggest to many Russians that America [and the
rest of the international community] [are] determined to support the
dismemberment of their country."' 92
Such international sentiments would provide the derzhavniki in the
Russian government a banner behind which to rally during election years.' 9'
The derzhavniki could portray the international condemnation as a violation
of Russia's territorial integrity and its political independence. As a result, the
other elements of the Russian government would be faced with a difficult
decision. They could embrace the world community and accede to the
secession of Chechnya, or they could turn away from the world community,
join the derzhavniki, and defend Russia's territorial integrity. Due to the
politically untenable nature of the first choice, it is more likely than not that
the ranks of the derzhavniki would grow, and that Russia would alienate itself
from the world community, thereby endangering its fledgling democracy and
capitalist economy, as well as regional stability and security. Many of the
countries of the international community have a vested interest in the success
of the new Russian order. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would be willing
to sacrifice that interest over Chechnya. Further, the world is especially
unwilling to alienate Russia because of its formidable military and nuclear
arsenal.
When deciding whether to apply the principles ofjus ad bellum, another
concern of the international community was the stability of the Caucasus
region. As I discussed above, the region is very susceptible to fragmentation
due to the presence of distinct ethnic groups, pockets of Slavic Russians,
general antagonism, and borders which were drawn to dilute rather than unite
local populations." Coming on the heels of the bloody conflict following the
disintegration of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,'95 the
192. Matlock, supra note 189, at 51.
193. At the time the fighting in Chechnya broke out, two important Russian elections were looming:
the December 1995 State Duma election and the June 1996 Russian Presidential election.
194. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text; Michael Specter, Facing Election, Yeltsin Is
Halting War on Chechens, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al.
195. Within the first three years of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, at least 200,000 civilians
had perished and over one million others had become refugees. Craig R. Whitney, Allies Give Provisional
Yes to Air Strikes on the Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1994, at AS.
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international community may have been hesitant to become involved in an area
which strongly resembled the Balkans.
In the former Yugoslavia, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the
E.U. precipitated the outbreak of war."9  Consequently, the similarities
between Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia hold increased importance.
First, both areas are inhabited by distinct ethnic groups who practice different
religions. Second, these different ethnic groups have a history of antagonism.
In the former Yugoslavia, this antagonism marked the relationships of all of
the main ethnic groups, 97 while in the Caucasus region, it was principally
focused against the Russian oppressors. 9" Third, conquerors imposed ethnic
diversity on both regions via forced colonization and restructuring of
borders.'" Finally, the two areas resemble each other in that they were both
recently released from the grip of authoritarian Communist governments. Due
to these similarities and the recent fighting in the former Yugoslavia, it would
seem that the possibility for violence and instability in the Caucasus region is
great. To avoid such an outcome, many countries may have decided not to
apply the principles ofjus ad bellum to the conflict in Chechnya.
In summary, the fragile state of the Russian democracy and the potential
for violence in the Caucasus made the application of jus ad bellum to the
Chechen conflict potentially costly. However, in spite of the benefits of
inaction, the decision to ignore the rules of war was not costless. Indeed, the
international community had a great deal on the line.
B. Rolling the Dice
When the international community decided not to act in Chechnya it was
taking a gamble. On the one hand, inaction had potential benefits. First, it
196. MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 163-64 (1994).
197. For an overview of the history of ethnic tension in the Balkans, see Jasminka Udovilki, The Rise
and Fall of the Balkan Idea, in YUGOSLAvIA'S ETHNIC NIGHTMARE: THE INSIDE STORY OF EUROPE'S
UNFOLDING ORDEAL 19 (Jasminka Udovidki & James Ridgeway eds., 1995).
198. For a history of the antagonism between the Russians and the Chechens, see supra notes 29-36
and accompanying text.
199. In the Balkans, successive waves of conquerors would colonize friendly regions in an effort to
create a buffer zone against future attacks. Udovidki, supra note 197, at 19-20. Later, Marshal Josip Broz
Tito, Communist leader of Yugoslavia, would pursue the policy of further fragmenting ethnic populations
in order to increase their dependence on the central government. NORA BELOFF, TITO'S FLAWED LEGACY
248 (1985). Similarly, in the Caucasus, it was a common Tsarist strategy to settle Cossacks in the hostile
territory. PANIcO, supra note 1, at 3. Also, like Tito, Stalin tried to weaken ethnic groups by fragmenting
them. Erlanger, supra note 17, at Al 4.
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would not alienate Russia. Consequently, Russia's capitalist democracy was
not jeopardized, and Russia preserved its potential of becoming a substantial
trading partner. Second, the international community was not forced to face
the issue of where to draw the line with regard to claims of self-determination.
Again, as Boutros-Ghali stated, "[I]f every ethnic, religious or linguistic group
claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace,
security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to
achieve."2' By not taking action in Chechnya, the international community
avoided lowering the standard for what qualified as a valid claim; and, as a
result, it escaped a potential slippery slope. Finally, by not acting, the
international community did not have to risk further destabilizing the
Caucasus.20
On the other hand, however, the international community sacrificed the
long-term benefit of an established rule of law on war. For centuries, the
world has been embroiled in warfare because the rules of war are not enforced.
Recently, in the Persian Gulf War, the actions of the United States and the
coalition forces under the auspices of the U.N. enhanced the credibility of the
principles ofjus ad bellum.2rs In Chechnya, the international community had
a chance to bolster the rule; but, instead, it chose to compromise the gains of
the Persian Gulf War. By taking this action, it sent two undesirable messages.
First, the international community communicated that it will apply the rules of
war selectively. In other words, there is a sliding scale. Second, it announced
that it is permissible to subjugate colonial people. Self-determination is not as
important as stability and trade.
These two messages undermine the rule of law and international respect
for the law. Further, they indicate that the international community is willing
200. Agenda for Peace, supra note 134, at 17.
201. The writings of Richard Holbrook, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, offer evidence that these concerns occupy the minds of world leaders. Holbrook stated, "[t]he
Chechnya conflict, terrible though it is, has not changed the nature of U.S. interests.... If the forces of
reform a[r]e embattled, the United States must reinforce, not retreat from, its support for them. The U.S.
objective remains a healthy Russia-a democratic Russia pursuing reform and respecting the rights of its
citizens, not fragmenting into ethnic conflict and civil war." Richard Holbrook, America, A European
Power, FOREIGN AFF., Apr.-Mar. 1995, at 39, 49-50. See also Steven Erlanger, Will State Dept. Rights
Advocate Get a Bigger Role?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1997, at A3. In this article, senior government officials
acknowledge that issues like human rights often take a backseat to "arguments that countries like Saudi
Arabia and Russia may be too fragile to weaken further by making human rights an overriding priority,
outweighing America's thirst for oil, regional security or, as in Russia's case, the prospects for democracy
itself." Id.
202. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the GulfConflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991).
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to sacrifice fairness and consistency for short term gains. As a result, they
damage the possibility that there will ever be lasting peace in the international
system.
CONCLUSION
Russia's actions in Chechnya have violatedjus ad bellum and customary
international law, but the rest of the world has chosen to look the other way.
By turning its head, the world is taking a gamble. It has sacrificed an
opportunity to strengthen the rule of law in international relations for the
possibility of gaining a strong new partner with whom it can pursue peace.
However, given Russia's apparent disregard for civilian casualties in
Chechnya, it is far from clear that it will ever evolve into a true partner in
peace. Nevertheless, the world has already placed its bet, and we must now
hope that its horse comes in.

